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ARTICLES
Industrial Standards, Antitrust, and the Logic of




The proper relationship between this nation's government and its
private free enterprise economic system has become a subject of
heated public debate.' As government's sphere of interest expands
ineluctably,2 this debate has intensified to the point that rational
discourse and analysis has become increasingly difficult. Unfortun-
ately, lost in the tumult of this consuming public colloquy has been
the quieter debate over the private versus the governmental devel-
opment of industrial standards, 3 a subject of significance to industry
but virtually unknown to most citizens.4 Recently, a Congressional
* B.S. 1962, J.D. 1965, The Creighton University. Member, Nebraska and New York Bars.
1. Government Intervention, 2477 BusiNEss WEEK 42 (April 4, 1977).
2. See L. LYONS, M. WATKINS, and V. AMBRAMSON, 1 GovFw.samNT AND ECONOMic LIFE
(1939) for a comprehensive treatment of the magnitude and scope of the growth of the federal
government up to World War II. See J.F. DEWHURST & Assoc., AMERICAN'S NEEDS AND
RESOURCES (1955) for present size and future growth projections.
3. The term "industrial standards" must be carefully defined to avoid confusion with
other types of standards, such as mandatory safety standards. Generally, the term will be
used generically in this article to include three other terms, "standardization,"
"simplification," and "certification." Standardization merely refers to the act of using a
standard by different manufacturers who wish to produce a uniform or identical product or
utilize a common design so their products will be interchangeable. Certification is the testing
of uniform products to determine whether they conform to a standard. Simplification is the
elimination of product types of varieties resulting in a standardized product. In sum, an
industrial standard would be used for a variety of purposes including the establishment of
(1) a common definition of an industrial term, (2) quality specifications for materials or
equipment, (3) procedures for the use or operation of a product or machinery, and (4) means
for rating product durability or performance. As used here, industrial standards are those
devised voluntarily, not under governmental compulsion or statutory fiat.
4. A recent report prepared for the United States Senate has commented on the full
impact of standards in particularly dramatic terms:
[Wihy does Superman always win in the end? The answer, surprisingly, can be
found at least in part in a trade product standard. The standard, voluntarily set and
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committee studied the topic,' and a bill was introduced by a Com-
mittee member which for the first time provided for governmental
particpation in the formulation and promulgation of industrial stan-
dards.6 Although the bill languishes in committee, the time remains
enforced by the Comics Magazine Association of America, forbids comic books from
depicting criminals as ultimately victorious.
Trade product standards (which essentially are written specifications of product
features) also help explain: Why most comic books have no nudity, but plenty of
violence; why our Nation's schools and offices are lit far more brightly than a genera-
tion ago, even though energy is now scarcer; why a machine bolt purchased in Albu-
querque will fit a nut in Ypsilanti; why typewriter keyboards are arranged inefficiently,
so weak pinkies must type the letter "a" while stronger forefingers type the seldom
used letter "v"; why consumers can't buy an energy-saving device that keeps heat from
escaping up the flue when their gas furnaces are off.
If you've never thought about these questions, or even about trade product standards
in general, don't worry. You're not alone. Trade product standards are an area of our
economy familiar to few consumers. Yet, as is often the case with such backwaters of
corporate activity, trade standards have an enormous impact on our lives. Some 20,000
trade standards at least partly determine the safety, availability, and price of products
ranging from household gas stoves to nuclear reactors. For consumers, trade product
standards dermine such things as the length of shoelaces; width of auto tires; ingredi-
ents of house paint; specifications of lawn mowers; sizes of door frames; and design of
child car seats.
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT TRADE PRODUCT
STANDARDS: A PRIMER FOR CONSUMERS PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND
MONOPOLY, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.'1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
RESPONSIVE LAW].
5. Hearings on Voluntary Industrial Standards Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
6. S. 825, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). This omnibus legislation, introduced by Senator
Abourezk and others, provides for a national policy for the development of product standards
and the testing and certification of product. Upon introducing the bill, Senator Abourezk
remarked:
[Tioday I am introducing a bill which will insure that private standards developers,
product testers, and certifiers conduct their activities in a manner consistent with our
antitrust laws and consumer protection policies ....
There are over 400 standards-developing organizations and several testing/certification
laboratories which are, in every respect, private regulatory agencies. These groups, who
operate with very little Federal or State oversight, determine what products you and I
will be able to purchase and which manufacturers will or will not enter the market-
place.
I do not quarrel with these groups getting together for this purpose, because stan-
dards . . . play an important role in a highly technical industrial society . . . . But,
all too often our procedures for setting standards yield precisely the opposite results.
Product standards . . . are unquestionably [among] today's most convenient
modes for restraining trade and deceiving customers.
CONG. REc. S3156 (daily ed. March 1, 1977).
In recent months, the Federal Trade Commission has also studied the standards process
Industrial Standards
eminenty appropriate for an examination of America's present poli-
cies toward stai~dards, for an evaluation of the adequacy of the
present standards system, and for a consideration of fresh policy
proscriptions for the future.
As the examination in this article reveals, there are failures on the
part of the nation to understand the exact nature of industrial stan-
dards, to grasp their industrial and technical importance, and to
appreciate the pervasiveness of their impact on all of economic so-
ciety. Not surprisingly, these failures have lead to inconsistent eco-
nomic and legal policies, and have generated untold economic costs
and losses from impaired commercial and consumer judgments. If
Congress is to come to grips with these failures, it must recognize
that they are symptomatic of a larger organizational malaise, and
it must decide between continued private development or future
governmental action. Congress should not base its decision on tradi-
tional ad hoc political principles, but on the superior strength of an
objective analytical method-such as the logic of economic science
known as "public choice analysis." The purpose of this article is to
determine whether this type of analysis can be fruitfully applied to
the question of privately or publicly developed standards.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS
The logic of public choice analysis7 suggests the circumstances
uder which governmental intervention may be more appropriate
than private initiative. Under this analysis,8 government would as-
sume an industrial function which is "public" in nature, while firms
in an industry would individually or interdependently fulfill all
"private" functions. To better understand these "private/public"
distinctions, consider an industrial market economy with few firms.
seriously and proposed a Trade Regulation Rule governing the internal operations of private
standards organizations. 16 C.F.R. § 457 (1978). Additional federal interest in standards has
been shown lately by the Office of Management and Budget (Circular on Standardization
(December 22, 1977)) and the Department of Commerce (A Recommended National Stan-
dards Policy for the United States (February 8, 1978)).
7. Public choice doctrine outlined in this area draws heavily on the writing of James
Buchanan. See J. BUCHANAN, THE BASEs FOR CoLLEcrIvE ACTION (1971) [hereinafter cited as
COLLEC'IVE ACTION]; J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY (1975); J. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND
AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC GOODS]. See also J. BUCH-
ANAN & G. TuLLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1965).
8. COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 7, at 1-2.
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In this type of basic economy, firms would perform all industrial
functions, and government intervention would be limited to the
enforcement of fundamental personal and property rights. Govern-
ment need not intrude more, since the firms themselves, by fulfill-
ing and satisfying their collective needs, would establish an orderly
and complete economic process. This basic economic system uses
the collective self-interests of firms to establish socially desirable
goals, and would be essentially private in nature Of course, not all
industrial interrelationships are reducible to a few firms. Some will
involve the simultaneous interaction of many firms in a considera-
bly more complex economy. In such multi-firm systems, transaction
costs would not be negligible as each firm would find it advanta-
geous to engage in strategic conduct with its rivals resulting in
delay, confusion, and other competitive difficulties.'" The substan-
tial problem of securing voluntary interaction among firms in this
more complex economy is referred to as the "free-rider" problem
and is the principal reason for remedial governmental action."
It should now be easy to see the logic of public choice analysis. If
an industrial activity involves most of an industry's firms in a com-
plex economy, transaction costs become prohibitive, and govern-
mental action may be necessary to reduce costs and secure tolerable
results even when balanced against the costs of an enlarged bu-
reaucracy.1 Governmental intercession may also be needed if signif-
icant "externalities" exist. 3 Since externality is by definition pres-
ent whenever a cost is incurred or a benefit is received by some as a
result of the activities of others, any function having an impact
outside the industry involved, or having free-rider complications,
may be best performed directly through governmental means.'
Is there a logical basis for making a choice between either the
private or public development of industrial standards based on
these public choice principles? By examining the current private
system first, it is seen that standards are developed interdepen-
dently through the efforts of industry in conjunction with technical
9. Id. at 3-4.
10. Id. at 5-6.
11. Id. at 6. See also PUBLIC GooDs, supra note 7, at 77-100 for an excellent theoretical
discussion of the free-rider problem.
12. COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 7, at 6.
13. Id. at 7. See also W. RIKER & P. OIDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL
THEORY 240-71 (1973).
14. COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 7, at 7-8.
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and engineering societies and trade associations, but rarely engag-
ing any interests apart from these narrow private concerns. This
system has developed some 20,000 standards which largely deter-
mine the quality, availability, and safety of the nation's entire eco-
nomic output as well as the techniques of production used to man-
ufacture and distribute these goods.15 Logic suggests that private
development, engaging only narrow competitive interests with
limited private perspectives, could not be expected to generate
essential, impartial, and non-discriminatory standards and would
not be mindful of their probable impact on society. Failure to in-
volve all potentially affected, and to consider their full external im-
pact, raises grave questions about continued private development.
Governmental action might reduce the "free-rider" problem by
engaging all groups likely to be affected, but might jeopardize the
private freedoms of the present voluntary process. Thus, conceptual
analysis reduces to a comparison of two second-best alternatives
both with some inherent disadvantages. Unfortunately, no logical
choice between the two can be made.
This pure a priori analysis does not yield a conclusive choice.
However, this article will demonstrate that a rational selection can
be made on more practical grounds, still within a public choice
framework. This can be done since the government itself has as-
sisted industry in developing standards in the past and its perform-
ance can be compared with private industry's. Comparative study
of the relevant economic, political, and legal factors will reveal a
uniquely superior standards organization processing both public
and private features as well as highlighting a historical conflict be-
tween standards and the antitrust laws.
Im. COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL STUDY OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS
This comparative study of industrial standards encompasses
three distinct historical stages. The first commences with several
early standards efforts during the Industrial Revolution, continuing
through the adoption of the Sherman Act and the Supreme Court's
initial attempts to develop a coherent competition policy, and con-
cludes with the First World War and government's first big stan-
15. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 1.
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dards effort. The second historical stage follows the favorable war
years experience into the 1920's, and includes an incipient confict
with the antitrust laws in the 1930's, which leads to an all out
enforcement seige in the 1940's. Standards continued under attack
at the beginning of the final period, and by the 1960's Congress
finally reacted by exploring alternative standards systems and seek-
ing some resolution of the antitrust dilemma. The study concludes
with Congressional lassitude, but not without ample evidence of a
unique standards organization.
A. First Historical Stage From the Industrial Revolution Through
the First World War
The modern history of industrial standards 6 commences with
that creative genius, Eli Whitney, imploring President Jefferson to
adopt uniform musket parts for the nation's defense. 7 On the
strength of such individual creativity," the history of standards pro-
ceeds well into the 19th century before the scientific revolution"
16 A relatively brief but very lucid and well organized account of the history of the
standards movement can be found in B. MELNITSKY, PROFITING FROM INDUSTRIAL
STANDARDIZATION 33-46 (1953). Additional useful historical facts and information can be found
in L. VERMAN, STANDARDIZATION 1-13 (1973); R. LEGGERT, STANDARDS IN CANADA 55-70 (1974);
NATIONAL STANDARDS IN A MODERN ECONOMY 5-31 (D. Reck ed. 1956); J. PERRY, THE STORY OF
STANDARDS 123-138 (1955); STANDARDS IN INDUSTRY (R. LANSI3URGH ED. 1928); NATIONAL IN-
DUSRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INDUSTRIAL STANDARDIZATION 1-15 (1929); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
CONFERENCE BOARD, INDUSTRIAL STANDARDIZATION 3-11 (No. 22) (1947); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
CONFERENCE BOARD, INDUSTRIAL STANDARDIZATION (No. 85) (1957); SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH
DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT ON VOLUNTARY
INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE COMMIT1EE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS,
93d Cong. 10-27 (1947); and D. HEMENWAY, INDUSTRYWIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS
(1975).
17. J. MIRSKY & A. NEVINS, THE WORLD OF ELI WHITNEY 201 (1952).
18. Reck, supra note 16, at 13-17. Some examples of early standardization would be the
first use of mass production by the grain milling industry. Milling had been a slow laborious
hand process, but was revolutionized with the introduction of continuously operating conve-
yors, elevators, and other mechanical devices. Reck, supra note 16, at 14-15.
Other examples were the standardization of shoe sizes, paper and bottle top sizes, and
matching of laces with shoes. PERRY, supra note 16, at 127.
19. An economist of the day in 1889 catalogued the scientific and technological develop-
ments of this remarkable era:
[Mlechanical reapers, mowing and seeding machines, the steam-plow and most other
eminently labor-saving agricultural devices; the Bessemer process and the steel rail
(1857); the submarine and transoceanic telegraph cables (1866); photography and all
its adjuncts; electroplating and the electrotype; the steamhammer, repeating and
breech-loading firearms, and rifled and steel cannon; gun-cotton and dynamite; the
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stimulated private collectivization2 along with voluntary interac-
tion and free rider problems.2 With each new discovery and innova-
industrial use of India-rubber and gutta-percha; the steam excavator and steam drill;
the sewing machine; the practical use of the electric light; the application of dynamic
electricity as a motor for machinery; the steam fire-engine; the telephone, microphone,
spectroscope, and tho process of spectral analysis; the polariscope; the compound
steam engine; the centrifugal process of refining sugar, the rotary printing press; hy-
draulic lifts, cranes and elevators; the 'regenerative' furnace, iron and steel ships,
pressed glass, wire rope, petroleum and its derivatives, and analine dyes; the industrial
use of the metal nickel, cotton-seed oil, artificial butter, stearine-candles, natural gas,
cheap postage, and the postage stamp. Electricity which a very few years ago was
regarded as something wholly immaterial, has now acquired a sufficiently objective
existence to admit of being manufacturing and sold the same as pig iron or leather.
D. WELLS, RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES (1889) (as quoted in H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST POLICY 63-64 (1955)).
Other technological advances of the American Industrial Revolution are surveyed in detail
in H. THOMPSON, THE AGE OF INVENTIONS (1921); POPULAR HISTORY OF AMERICAN INVENTIONS
(W. Kaempffert ed. 1924); A. USHER, A HISTORY OF MECHANICAL INVENTION (1929); J. OLIVER,
HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY (1956); and R. KIRBY, ENGINEERING IN HISTORY (1956).
20. In 1884 electrical manufacturers established standard size light bulbs for electric
lamps after enduring 175 different socket sizes. PERRY, supra note 16, at 127. Both the auto-
mobile and tire industries worked on uniform tire sizes, and, with the Society of Automobile
Engineers, automobile producers developed standard dimensions, materials, and nomencla-
ture. C. PEARCE, TRADE ASSOCIATION SURVEY 309-11 (TNEC Monograph No. 18, 1941) and
J. GAILLARD, INDUSTRIAL STANDARDIZATION: ITS PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION (1934). Also, be-
tween 1909 and 1911 the tire industry standardized and stabilized the design, fabrics, and
construction of tires and by 1911 had increased total annual production to over six million
tires. V. CLARK, III HISTORY OF MANUFACTRERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1893-1928, 236-37 (1929).
Collaboration with engineering and technical societies, as well as trade associations, further
facilitated the collective process. In 1904 the nation's Portland cement producers formed an
association for developing standards, id. at 254-56; the Glass Blower's Association took an
active political, posture for its members against standardized and cheaper mass bottle produc-
tion, M. WATKINS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 144-46 (1927); the Association
of American Steel Manufacturers in 1895 formulated standard specifications for steel cast-
ings, axles, forgings, rails and structural steel, CLARK, supra at 80, and in 1898 the National
Association of Wool Manufacturers advocated specialized plants for production of standard-
ized wool products. Id.
21. As the collective process expands, there is clear evidence of voluntary interaction
difficulties and free-rider manifestations. The interminable screw thread controversy is an apt
example. For years, industry had produced different sizes of thread, and attempted without
success at an 1864 conference to agree collectively on a standard size. In 1919 Congress finally
stepped in and appointed a national commission authorized to establish a standard size -
after industry failed on its own for over fifty years. Reck, supra note 16, at 15-17; LEGGERT,
supra note 16, at 55-60; and MELNITSKY, supra note 16, at 36-37. Another early example is
the usage by railroads of different couplings, track sizes, and sizes and shapes of rolling stock.
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 16, at 10; and MELNITSKY, supra note
16, at 36-37. Only after the government intervened in 1862 did the railroads become inter-
changeable and standardized, and the east finally merged the westward frontier through an
interconnecting transportation system. Reck, supra note 16, at 19. Impressive as they were,
the remarkable material gains of the Industrial Revolution were completely vulnerable to
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tion22 an inevitable struggle erupted between existing commercial
realities and emerging technological imperatives.2 3 This struggle led
to increased incentives to protect investments in outmoded capital
and to use the standardization process to retard the implementation
of new technology and the development of new and varied prod-
ucts. 24 In time the whole process would be employed by industry to
establish a consensus as to product types, productive methods, com-
petitive strategies, and prices.2 5 And, through the infamous
destruction by fire until fire fighting equipment was standardized uniformly by local govern-
ments across the country. Unfortunately, the decisive impetus for standardization was the
almost total destruction of the city of Baltimore. Letter Circular 1947 of the Department of
Commerce, National Bureau of Standards, entitled The Development and Use of Voluntary
Standards (rev. February 1973). The Baltimore fire incident is also retold in an earlier Bureau
of Standard's Publication entitled Standards for Progress 703 (1966). The Bureau estimated
tht the holocaust required fire fighting units from as far as New York City, Philadelphia,
Annapolis and Wilmington, and that many arrived only to find that few of their hoses
matched or fitted the local hydrants. Destroyed in the inferno were 1,526 buildings and all
utility and power facilities in a radius of 70 city blocks. LEGGERT, supra note 16, at 59.
22. The pace of scientific and technological discovery is exemplified by Patent Office
reports of an average of 77 inventions made annually each year over a 20-year period from
1790 to 1811, and the significant increase in the year 1830 to 544 patents. Even more astonish-
ing were later Patent Office reports that it issued 6,460 patents from 1841 to 1850, and that
patents increased to 25,250 over the next decade. H. FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HIsToRY
248 (1960).
See also THORELLI, supra note 19, at 63-64.
23. Id. at 64. A factually rich discussion of the historic failure of corporations to embrace
each new technological discovery eagerly is in J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION 228-36
(1972). Blair claims that corporations may eschew technological process for a variety of
reasons, including the "desire to protect the investment in an older technology." Id. at 228.
24. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 16, at 10-11 and PERRY, supra
note 16, at 127-28. Such intra-industry cooperation was apparently one of America's distinc-
tive and unique characteristics as was first observed and commented upon by America's
foremost social observer of the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville. In his remarkably insight-
ful treatise, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1935), Tocqueville observed that:
Americans of all ages, all conditions and all dispositions, constantly form associations
... . The most democratic country on the face of the earth is that in which men in
our times have carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the
objects of their common desire, and have applied this new science to the greatest
number of purposes.
Quoted in Melnitsky, surra note 16, at 37.
25. Victor S. Clark, an important observer of this period in history, has summarized the
inter-play of these dynamic forces:
Great manufacturing combinations in addition to regulating production and stabi-
lizing prices, have standardized goods and services, without which price control is
impossible, and created habits of consumption. In other words they have standardized
not only the wares they made but also the tastes of those who use them. They have
thus strengthened their hold upon their market, economized production costs, and
widened their circle of consumers. On the other hand, dangers unknown in the slower
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"combination and trust" device,2" significant economic power was
consolidated,27 with the public's distrust of concentrated power, pro-
voking Congress in 1890 to adopt the Sherman Act. 28
days of old threaten their posterity. A growing share of our manufacturing product now
consists of unessentials . . . determined largely by fashion and caprice . . . Further-
more, new inventions have displaced what had come to be considered staple necessi-
ties. The incandescent bulb supplanted the kerosene lamp; the furnace, the stove; the
Ford car, the light buggy; the radio set, the Victrola. So new disturbances have inter-
rupted the market rhythm just when manufacturers seem to have discovered a way to
govern its pulsations.
CLARK, supra note 20, at 354.
26. There are few contemporaneous treatments of the problems and consequences of the
combination and trust movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These include the
notable J. MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUSTS: A DESCRIPTTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN
TRUST MOVEMENT (1904), which describes various trust groups around 1900 and evaluates thiir
significance; W. RIPLEY, TRusTS, POOLS AND CORPORArIONS (1916); J. JENKS & W. CLARKE, THE
TRUST PROBLEM (1917); J. HENDICKS, THE AGE OF BIG BUSINESS (1919); and M. JOSEPHSON,
THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS, 1865-1901 (1935).
27. The total aggregation of economic power captured by the trusts was calculated in
impessive numbers in 1904:
[Aiggregate capitalization [in] the 318 important and active Industrial Trusts in
this country is at the present time no less that $7,246,342,533, representing in all
consolidations of nearly 5,300 distinct plants, and covering practically every line of
productive industry in the United States ...
In the matter of control of their respective industries or markets . . . these percen-
tages range all the way from 10% to 95%, and there are many cases in which the Trust
does not control more than 40%. Of the total . . . [industrial trusts], however, 78
control 50% or more of their product, and 57 control 60% or more. Twenty-six control
80% or over.
Thus, it will be seen that including Industrial, Franchise, Transportation and mis-
cellaneous, about 445 active Trusts . . . [have] a total capitalization of
$20,379,162,551. They embrace in all about 8,664 original companies.
MOODY, supra note 28, at 485-89. A modern industrial economist has isolated a 19th century
factor contributing to the growth of "big business" which, in his words, "set the stage for
antitrust." He discovered that "capital-intensive production on a large scale . . . enjoyed
a rapid rise to prominence . . . partly because of. . . the use of interchangeable parts." See
F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 442 (1970).
28. The origin, passage and early enforcement of the Sherman Act are discussed in W.
Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 221 (1956)
and LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY N AMERICA (1965); A. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW
(1910); J. CLARK, FEDERAL TRUST POLICY (1931); 0. KNAUrH, POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
TOWARD INDUSTRIAL MONOPOLY (1913); T. McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAws 16-25 (1933); W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 5-11 (TNEC Monograph No.
16, 1940); Edmunds, Interstate Trust and Commerce Act of 1890, 194 N. AM. REV. 801 (1911);
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-95 (1940); Bork, Legislative Intent and the
Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAw & EcoN. 7, 21-24 (1966); A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES 6-30 (2d ed. 1970); and most prominently, THORELLI, note 20 supra.
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Within the Sherman Act is embodied the fundamental competi-
tive character of the nation's free enterprise system." The Act pro-
motes the public's welfare through the impersonal allocation of re-
sources by proscribing every contract, combination, and conspiracy
in restraint of trade among competing enterprises."0 However, this
objective proved elusive because of the Act's broad and all encom-
passing language.3' Conceivably, every contract and agreement, in-
cluding the collective development of standards, could be illegal
under a literal interpretation of the Act. Clearly, if the Act were to
be interpreted and enforced rationally, a statutory rule of construc-
tion would have to be adopted. It was twenty years before an at-
tempt was made.
In the beginning of these twenty years, the Justice Department
instituted only a few cases 32 and did not directly challenge stan-
dards, possibly as agreements to eliminate product types, but did
bring one monumental case which upon review by the Supreme
Court resulted in that long awaited rule of construction. From the
time of this decision, United States v. Standard Oil, 3 industrial
arrangements not directly and immediately impinging on prices
would be lawful, if passing a full competitive evaluation for
"unreasonable" effects. But, since standards can affect prices, it
remained for the Court to determine whether they would pass such
an analysis. The next year the Court in United States v. Standard
Sanitary Manufacturing Company34 articulated some economic cir-
cumstances which could render a standard illegal. In this decision
the Court ruled that an agreement to manufacture a preferred prod-
uct grade at a fixed price, and the discontinuance of an inferior
grade, was "unreasonable" and hence illegal under Section 1. But,
having decided that the concerted elimination of "seconds" was
unlawful to help fix the price of a standardized grade, the Court
impliedly raised the larger question of whether any product elimina-
29. J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 38-49 (1976).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
31. M. HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONsTRucTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTI-.
TRUST LAWS 1-9 (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941).
32. NEALE, supra note 28, at 28-29. See also Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust
Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 365, 366 (1970). Posner in his article has many interesting
charts and graphs depicting the historical levels of Sherman Act enforcement, both federal
and private, as well as enforcement of other antitrust statutes.
33. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
Vol. 17: 3-4
1978-79 Industrial Standards
tion would be lawful since it affects the price of the remaining prod-
uct. Even the broader Chicago Board of Trade35 test of 1918 did not
satisfactorily resolve this question. In the language of this decision,
standards do not "merely" regulate, but can "suppress or even de-
stroy" competition among competitors in product types and varie-
ties-much less enhance the price of a standardized product. Thus,
since standards can be so inimical to competition, this very general
test would not establish their legality.
During these early years, the Sherman Act's broad and imprecise
proscription against collective business agreements and the Su-
preme Court's uncertain judicial interpretations did not retard the
development of standards.36 In fact, with the advent of the 20th
century,3 17 the formulation of standards continued, but with a criti-
35. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
In Chicago Board of Trade, the Court was called upon to review a rule which prohibited
members of the Board from purchasing grain after closing hours at prices in excess of the day's
final bid. The Court held that in view of the potential competitive impact of the Board's rule,
its legality could only be determined by thoroughly evaluating all relevant economic factors.
This evaluation, known since Standard Oil as the "rule of reason" test involves an analysis
of:
[Wlhether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be obtained, are all relevant facts. This
is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of the intent may help the court to interpret facts and
to predict consequences.
Id. at 238.
36. See historical sources enumerated in note 16 supra.
37. With the advent of the 20th century significant technological advances generated
additional machine and industrial improvements which in turn became the latest standards
for manufacturing industries. Technology advanced during this period across a broad front:
[T]he years 1897-1917 were productive of many inventions or improved processes.
Many lists of such inventions or discoveries have been offered. One presented to the
Temporary National Economic Committee suggested twenty-four: 1898, radium
(Curie); 1899, loading coil for long distance telegraphy and telephony (Pupin); 1900,
highspeed tool steel (Taylor and White); 1900, Nernst lamp; 1902, hydrogenation of
oils; 1903, first man lifting airplane (The Wrights); 1903, oil-buring steamer; 1903,
tantatum lamp (Van Bolton); 1903, flotation process for nonferrous metals; 1905, cy-
animide process for nitrogen fixation (Rothe); 1905, domestic electric washing ma-
chine; 1906, snythetic resins (Backeland); 1906, tungsten lamp; 1907, television photo-
graph (Korn); 1907, multiple disc clutch; 1909, Duralumin (Wilm); 1910, gyrocompass
(Sperry); 1910, synthetic ammonia process for nitrogen fixation (Haber); 1914, tung-
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cal difference. Standards were no longer randomly formulated
through the private action of individuals, corporations, and regional
industries. They now arose through their combined efforts along
with engineering and scientific societies and trade associations. In
order to buttress their efforts, they asked Congress to create a gov-
ernmental organization which, with their consultation, would estab-
lish the National Bureau of Standards38 to provide technical stan-
dards advice and assistance as a supplement to industry's efforts."
With collectivization reaching national proportions at the close of
the last century, standards had already achieved significant
''externality" potential and demonstrated some of the "free-rider"
symptomotology of what is in economic logic a public rather than a
private function. Standardization by private interests did not por-
tend well, were it not for the spill-over benefits from the nation's
approaching all out collective defense effort. 0
Upon entering World War I,41 America marshalled resources with
a vengeance. A War Industries Board 2 was promptly organized to
increase productive capacity and conserve necessary resources.13 It
temporarily nationalized industries, controlled their procurements,
and monitored prices. The Board eventually regulated the manufac-
ture of some 30,000 products and reduced costs in over 260 indus-
tries by standardizing product styles, varieties, sizes, and colors."
sten filament light (Coolidge); 1917, mechanical refrigeration.
H. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE OF LAISSEZ FmRE 120 (1951).
38. PERRY, supra note 16, at 127-32; Reck, supra note 16, at 31-48; MELNITSKY, supra note
16, at 44-45.
39. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 16, at 124-28. See generally R.
COCHRANE, MEASURES FOR PROGRESS: A HISTORY OF THE NATINAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS (1966).
40. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 16, at 11-12.
41. The monumental mobilization task facing America assumed awesome dimensions:
The magnitude of the task of war supply may be portrayed to some degree in
quantitative terms. During the course of the war the government is estimated to have
spent for military purposes some 22 billion dollars, a sum larger than the total cost of
the federal government during the entire period from 1791 to the outbreak of the war.
Affected by these expenditures of government were some 30,000 different types of
commodities relating to all of the 344 census categories of industries. Many of these
products were wholly or partly new in design and required new types of equipment for
their manufacture. A large number were required in quantities greater than had ever
before been produced in our country.
L. LYON & V. ABRAMSON, II GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE 1065 (1940).
42. A definitive and recent historical analysis of the War Industries Board is found in R.
CUFF, THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD (1973).
43. SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 10-12.
44. Everyone was touched closely and intimately by government's efforts to simplify and
Vol. 17: 3-4
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Further coordination was achieved directly through Presidential
implementation of joint industrial practices." Although Congres-
sionally mandated, the Congress did not immunize the participants,
and no one, even the Justice Department, voiced antitrust objec-
tions." In fact, the Attorney General tacitly recognized the vital
importance of wartime industrial cooperation rather than competi-
tion, and later remarked publicly that the antitrust laws were
"somewhat narrowed during the War by the direct intervention of
the Government itself in industry, trade, and transportation."47 One
standardize in order to aid the War effort. The degree to which these efforts affected ever-
yone's lives and the nation's industrial production is depicted in G. CLARKSON, INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA IN THE WORLD WAR 210-225 (1923).
Bernard Baruch, the venerable head of the Board, in his 1921 final report commented on
the sheer magnitude of this governmental standardization effort:
The War Industries Board, by means of its system of priorities, worked out a pro-
gram for the operation of industrial plants on the balanced basis. It controlled the
awarding of contracts, the fixing of prices, the allotments of raw materials, power and
labor. Non-essential industries, such as super luxuries, were discouraged, essential
industries were encouraged. Its economies through standardization and simplification
of industrial products were very great. It saved 50,000,000 yards of wool, 260,000 tons
of tinplate; cut the styles of stoves and heaters 75 per cent, eliminated 5,500 styles in
rubber footwear, cut tire varieties from 287 to 32, cut shoe colors from 81 to 6, cut
trunks to 6 sizes, reduced washing machine styles from 446 to 18, and eliminated 90
per cent of household wringer styles, cut pocket knives from 300 styles to 45, plows from
312 to 76, harrows from 589 to 38, and saved 600,000 barrels of flour by improved bread
marketing methods .. .
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE Board, supra note 16, at 11-12.
45. The Lever Act, 40 Stat. L. 276 (1917). Section two thereof provided:
That in carrying out the purposes of this Act the President is authorized to enter
into any voluntary arrangements or agreements, to create and use any agency or
agencies, to accept the services of any person without compensation, to cooperate with
any agency or person, to utilize any department or agency of the Government, and to
coordinate their activities so as to avoid any preventable loss or duplication of effort
of funds.
See also CUFF, supra note 42, at 310-12.
During the War, the Department did institute one action with standards implications.
United States v. George H. Mead, Cr. No. 9-371 (S.D.N.Y. April 12, 1917) (indictment
returned), civil complaint filed November 26, 1971, Eq. No. 14-384, S.D.N.Y., consent decree
entered November 26, 1917. In this Section 1 indictment it was charged that several newsprint
manufacturers unlawfully conspired to increase the price of newsprint, to discourage the
erection of new mills and the installation of new machinery, and to restrain competition in
the quality of papers, thus, in effect, conspiring to maintain as a standard for the industry
the then current quality of paper. Unfortunately, the district court did not have an opportun-
ity to rule on the reasonableness of these practices, since the manufacturers entered with the
Department into a consent judgment enjoining the continuation of this conspiracy. See Com-
ment, The Sherman Act and the War, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 137 (1918).
46. Fisher, Antitrust During National Emergencies: I, 40 MICH. L. REV. 969, 991 (1942).
47. Id. at 995.
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astute observer did see a difficulty, and prophesized a conflict after
the War between the dictates of the antitrust laws and the in-
dustrial practices necessitated by the exigencies of the times.4 All
in all, however, the nation's ultimate victory was accomplished in
part through this major governmentally sponsored standardization
effort achieved through the close cooperation of industry, trade asso-
ciations, and technical societies.4 Unfortunately, America's histori-
cal antipathy toward governmental intervention plus industry's as-
sumed credit for the War's standardization successes meant contin-
ued private development and further problems with this inherently
defective collective process. 0
B. Second Historical Stage From the 1920s Through the Second
World War
Commencing with a landmark engineering study, which claimed
a twenty-five percent cost reduction for standardized production,5'
48. CLARKSON, suppa note 44, at 313-14.
49. SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 12, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFER-
ENCE BOARD, supra note 16, at 11-12; PEARCE, supra note 20, at 310-12.
A historical review of the period suggests that the standards experiences of the War pro-
vided a major impetus for increased productivity gains in following years:
Another influence that facilitated gains in efficiency in this period was a delayed
effect of measures inaugurated during the war itself, the full benefit of which could
not be enjoyed while they were still unfamiliar . . . mass production methods in
building ships, airplane motors, and many other goods proved themselves on a large
scale at the end of the war and were later extended where volume of output was
adequate to justify them and the product could be sufficiently standardized. The great
addition to plant and machinery - much of it of new design - installed for war
purposes now took effect in economies of peacetime production. Standardization of
parts and processes, reduction of the number of styles and designs, and the method of
modem engineering management. . . had been made familiar to many during the war
and now were adopted on a wider scale.
Quoted from G. SOULE, PROSPERITY DECADE 128 (1947).
50. It has been suggested that some businessmen used the occasion of the War as a very
convenient excuse to standardize, and that there were no legitimate requirements to
"rationalize... [an] industry and end the confusion of a multiple of competing styles, sizes
and so on." On the other hand, some business interests felt that standardization "is in reality
[in] the best interests of the trade . . . The number of shapes that have been produced and
the number of decorations brought out and specifically made and carried in open stock have
been little short of reckless." Some questions regarding the standards concept would be
hardly surprising in light of such diverse opinions. See CUFF, supra note 42, at 203-04.
51. AMERICAN ENGINEERING COUNCIL, WASTE IN INDUSTRY (1921). The WASTE IN INDUSTRY
report claimed that savings from standardization in six typical industries could amount to
$10 billion annually, and that wasteful practices in these industries accounted for almost 50%
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and with the appointment of Herbert Hoover, who authored the
study, as Secretary of Commerce, the nation entered its supreme
industrial standards epoch. Immediately, Hoover instituted a far
ranging standardization program52 which only motivated industry
further to try once again for mandatory standards legislation. Hoo-
ver balked, believing fervently that standards must be voluntarily
established, but authorized his Department to work directly with
industry in resolving standards problems. 53 His programs for indus-
try and trade associations were famously successful,5 but unbek-
of all materials and labor. The six industries and the rather astonishing percentage savings
were: metal trades - 29%; shoe manufacturers - 41%; textile manufacturers - 49%; build-
ing trades - 54% printing industry - 58%; and men's clothing manufacturers - 64%.
Quoted from SCIENCE POuCY RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 12.
52. Id. at 12-13. The new division in the Bureau of Standards was very active. For exam-
ple, recommendations issued by the division resulted in reductions in
[H]otel chinaware from 700 to 160 varieties, files and rasps from 1,351 to 496 types,
milk bottles from 49 to 9 different designs, and book and magazine papers from 267 to
11 sizes. Recommendations on the verge of acceptance ranged from warehouse and
invoice forms to paintbrushes and paper bag sizes. Totting up the rewards as leaders
in the crusade, representatives in nine important industries cooperating with the divi-




54. It has been reported that in 1926 trade associations were engaged in standards work,
and that by 1938 the number increased to 725. The nation's first standards-making engineer-
ing society, the American Society for Testing Materials, had formulated by the late 1930's
about 800 standards for its 4,000 members. The nation's other principal standards society,
the American Standards Association, had a membership of more than 60 national trade
associations and technical societies, several federal governmental departments, and approxi-
mately 2,000 private firms. Over these years, the Bureau of Standards worked with hundreds
of national and local associations and promulgated over 100 commercial standards. LYON,
supra note 2, at 274-84; A. BuRNs, DECLINE OF COMPETION 43-103 (1936); and SCIENCE POLICY
RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 14.
As to the type of diverse standards work conducted by these trade associations and techni-
cal societies in the later 1930's, the American Zinc Institute licensed steel manufacturers
without charge to use the Institute's "Seal of Quality" trademark on galvanized sheets meet-
ing Institute specifications; the Bureau of Explosives, a cooperative agency of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Association of American Railroads, studied dangerous explo-
sives to insure compliance with ICC regulations; the National Electrical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation and the American Standards Association promoted standards affecting the rating,
construction, performance and durability of electrical apparatus and equipment; and the
Tire and Rim Association developed standards affecting sizes and shapes for tires, rims,
wheels and related parts. Additional work was also conducted by the Rail Steel Bar Associa-
tion, The Sanitary Institute of America, The Tanners' Council of America, and the National
Door Manufacturers Association. PEARCE, supra note 20, at 316-17.
Further encouragement for industries to engage in cooperative action was provided by the
Federal Trade Commission. Shortly after the War, the Commission was persuaded to identify
Duquesne Law Review
nownst to the standards community a massive retaliatory antitrust
campaign loomed ominously ahead in future years.
The Department could not launch a vigorous standards assault
in the wake of Standard Oil and Chicago Board of Trade. It had to
devise a way around the "reasonableness" criteria if any collective
industrial practice were to be condemned by the Supreme Court.
The Department's first strategy was to re-vitalize Standard
Sanitary by filing a price-fixing action against several tile manufac-
turers55 for conspiring to "standardize the shapes of tile made, elimi-
nating many now sold, and establish[ing] the use of standardized
catalogues." 6 The defendants agreed to stop fixing prices in a con-
sent decree, 57 but were specifically allowed, through their trade asso-
ciation, to engage in the "standardization of quality and of technical
and scientific terms, and elimination of non-essential type, sizes, or
grades of products."" The Department may have re-established the
clear illegality of price fixing, but by sanctioning standardization it
returned to a philosophical quandry over the "reasonableness" of
collective private interests, rather than the impersonal market
the trade practices which should be included in the category of "unfair methods of competi-
tion" (the operative language of Section 5a of the Commission's Statutory mandate of 1914
from Congress). 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V, 1975). Out of this interest grew the Commission's
trade practice conference procedure through which industrial representatives could meet with
the Commission's staff and urge them to adopt standards of fair and proper trade practices.
The number of trade practices increased steadily from 1919 as industry became aware of the
advantages of "cooperative" planning. By 1929 the Commission decided to revise its trade
practice rules since some were believed to induce behavior in violation of the Sherman Act.
The Commission's trade practice procedure became superfluous and ceased having import-
ance with Congress's adoption in 1933 of the National Industrial Recovery Act (Act of June
16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, as amended and modified by Act of June 14, 1935, ch. 246, 49
Stat. 375) which contained explicit trade practice procedures. For more details see the follow-
ing references from which the above facts were drawn: M. WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF
COMPETrrIvE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 241-49 (1940), T. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 92-94 (1932). BURNs, supra at 69-73 and J. CLARK, supra note 32, at 228.
55. United States v. Tile Manufacturers Credit Association, petition filed, Eq. 201 (S.D.
Ohio January 10, 1922). See also United States v. Gypsum Industries Association, petition
filed Eq. 25-215 (S.D.N.Y. December 27, 1922). For a discussion of the practical implications
of these two actions refer to NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
185-186 (1925).
56. E. Timberlake, Standardization and Simplification Under the Antitrust Laws, 29
CORNELL L.Q. 301, 309-10 (1944).
57. A consent decree was entered on November 26, 1923, dissolving the association and
perpetually enjoining a further operation of the combination. On April 23, 1928, a supplemen-
tal decree permitting the exchange of certain information was entered.
58. Timberlake, supra note 56, at 309.
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forces of the Sherman Act, being the final arbiter of product varia-
tions.
The Department's next strategy was to convince the Supreme
Court that every price fixing agreement was per se illegal. In a 1927
case, United States v. Trenton Potteries,5" several manufacturers of
bathroom pottery fixtures were charged with eliminating a second-
grade of pottery in aid of their agreement to fix the price of a more
preferred grade. Consistent with its holding in Standard Sanitary,
the Court rejected the manufacturers' contention that the price was
lawfully fixed at a "reasonable" level, and held that a fixed price
can never, irrespective of the circumstances, be "reasonable" under
the Standard Oil doctrine. 0 It took several years, but the Depart-
ment6' finally managed to return the Court to its position before
Standard Oil. But, with only the limited teachings of Standard
Sanitary, Trenton Potteries, and the 1923 tile manufacturers de-
cree, the legality of collective standards, if not collective price fix-
ing, was still problematic. Additionally, the Supreme Court articu-
lated advanced antitrust doctrine in two cases6 2 which circum-
scribed the internal operations of a collective standardization pro-
59. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
60. Id. at 395-402.
61. Although the internal position of the Department regarding the legality of standards
is not known, some astute students of industry were aware in 1925 of potential illegality in
certain aggravating circumstances. During an October, 1925 conference sponsored by the
Academy of Political Science, one participant reported that some practices of trade associa-
tions
fall on the borderline . . . [namely those] which have a tendency to stabilize business
and to make prices uniform . . . [The] standardization of products, of trade practices
and of cost accounting methods fall within the class and the legality. . . will depend
upon the absence or presence of some agreement, expessed or implied, to fix prices,
limit production or divide territory.
J. CLARK, supra note 32, at 246. -
62. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914);
United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). In Eastern States
the Justice Department alleged that a trade association of retail lumber dealers conspired to
blacklist and boycott wholesale lumber dealers which had taken consumer sales from mem-
bers. The Supreme Court found that the "black list" resulted in retailers withholding their
patronage from the wholesalers, and concluded that this amounted to a boycott in unreasona-
ble restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
In Terminal Ass'n, the Supreme Court was confronted with the Association's requirement
that other railroads could not use its terminal without permission. Although use of this
extremely important railroad terminal had never been foreclosed, the Court found the poten-
tial to limit railroad entry into St. Louis to be inconsistent with freedom of competition. 224
U.S. at 400-01.
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gram, not necessarily found to fix prices covertly, but run in con-
junction with a trade association or the Bureau of Standards. In
accordance with these new principles, standards benefits can nei-
ther be withheld or bestowed selectively nor manipulated to boycott
or exclude recalcitrant firms from an industry.
The consequences of these early decisions were beginning to have
an impact on the industrial community . 3 Legal risks were asso-
ciated with the elimination of competition in product quality and
with the exclusion of "seconds"" in order to fix prices or exclude
competitors. Whether a standard in and of itself would violate Sec-
tion 1 remained largely unknown. The 1923 consent decree and
Chicago Board of Trade suggest more questions than they resolve
in this regard. A definitive answer could only be provided by a
Supreme Court squarely faced with the question.
The Court did allude to a possible sympathetic position toward a
type of standard in its 1925 Maple Flooring decision. 5 In this case,
the Court was called upon to review the Department's allegation
that an association illegally exchanged among its members certain
cost data in order to fix prices. The Court held the exchange lawful,
and noted that "The defendants have engaged in many activities to
which no exception is taken by the Government and which are ad-
mittedly beneficial to the industry and to consumers; such as coop-
erative advertising and the standardization and improvement of the
product."1 Here, for the very first time, the Court commented on
standards, and did so approvingly at least for those with "product
improvement" benefits-but, then again, standards as such were
63. General discussions of the early development of the antitrust law of standards can be
found in the following: F. JONES, TRADE ASSOCIATION ACTivrrEs AND THE LAW (1922);
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TRADE ASSOCIATION AcTIvrIEs (1927); B. KIRSH, TRADE ASSOCIA-
TIONS: THE LEGAL ASPECTS (1928); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, OPEN-PRICE TRADE ASSOCIA-
TIONS, S. Doc. No. 226, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929); B. KIRSH AND A. SHAPIRO, TRADE ASSOCIA-
TIONS IN LAW AND BUSINESS (1938) and LYONS, note 2 supra.
64. Regarding the elimination of "seconds," a contemporaneous treatise noted:
The arbitrary elimination of cheaper grades, because they are less profitable thaL
higher grade products or because they interfere with the sale of goods the production
of which is rendered exceptionally renumerative by parents or a skilled labor monopoly
or some other supply curtailing factor, would seem hard to justify under the rule of
reason. Similarly, agreements not to market 'seconds' which are sometimes made in
certain industries, may be eventually brought under attack.
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 55, at 186.
65. Maple Flooring Mfgrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
66. Id. at 566.
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not really under attack. If they were, would the Court have failed
to recognize their implicit price effects and their inevitable exclu-
sionary impact on the fims and all the others left out of the private
collective process?
These theoretical questions still defy easy answers, but some in-
dustrialists of the day at least started a search for some practical
solutions. They contacted Secretary Hoover who in turn asked the
Attorney General for his opinion of trade associations standardizing
their members products. 7 The Attorney General found the practice
lawful unless trade was restrained, prices fixed, or production cur-
tailed." They remained concerned and at their urging counsel for
the Commerce Department reviewed the 1923 consent decree and
the Maple Flooring case" and based on this meager authority con-
cluded that "standardization and simplification programs as car-
ried out by the [Commerce] Department do not involve any agree-
ment on the part of those interested to restrict production. They
comprehend that the standards, sizes, types or styles agreed upon
shall be recognized by the industry as the standards and that any-
one a party thereto is free to manufacture other styles, sizes or types
than those which it is agreed shall be recognized as the standards. ,,71
Of course, since the collective process, itself, is a form of agreement,
such legal reasoning would not be very reassuring to the industrial
community. The Federal Trade Commission was not of much assis-
tance either. In 1920 its Chairman unqualifiedly endorsed standards
without noting that they may be illegal if they unreasonably restrain
trade. He stated that "while standardization and elimination (of
superfluous or little-used farm equipment) did not involve any ques-
tionable legal issue, the necessity for standard specifications in
order that costs and prices may be compared is apparent."'7' Several
years later another Chairman commented to the Secretary of Com-
merce that "In no matter has the Commission ever held standardi-
zation of commodities by members of an industry to be violative of
any of the statutes it has the duty of enforcing. '72 He neglected to
warn of the relatively uncertain state of the law and the potentially
67. TIMERLAKE, supra note 56, at 308.
68. Id. at 309.
69. Id. at 309 n.27.
70. Id. at 310.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 313.
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grave legal implications of an improperly formulated and adminis-
tered standards program.
The law's rational evolution and development was further de-
terred by the cataclysmic economic events of the 1930's. The Su-
preme Court in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,13 recogniz-
ing these perilous circumstances, approved a cooperative sales
agency which fixed prices and standardized grades for coal produ-
cers. Congress, likewise, reordered national policies74 by encouraging
industrial cooperatives and fostering "codes" of joint antitrust im-
munized practices. 5 But only after two years, the Court declared
Congress' social experiment unconstitutional" and restored the
nation's functional competitive policy." These conflicting and
73. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
74. L. LEVERETT, THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 3 (1935). See National In-
dustrial Recovery Act of June, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, as amended and modified by the
Act of June 14, 1935, ch. 246, 49 Stat. 375. The legal and antitrust implications of this
legislation are discussed in Handler, The National Industrial Recovery Act, 19 A.B.A.J. 440
(1933); Wahrenbock, Federal Antitrust Law and the National Industrial Recovery Act, 31
MICH. L. REv. 1009 (1933); Regan, Industrial Recovery and the Anti-Trust Laws, 13 B.U. L.
REv. 577 (1933); and Fisher, Anti-Trust During National Emergencies: II, 40 MicH. L. REV.
1161 (1942).
75. These codes covered a multitude of commercial practices incuding quality and service
competition. In some codes, the products of all sellers were standardized, and forty-eight
codes authorized the regulation of the marketing of second-grade products. BuRNs, supra note
54, at 508. In some industries, additions to and deductions from the prices of standard
products because of departures from basic specifications were standardized in Codes. Moreo-
ver, the conditions under which allowances could be made for goods returned were standard-
ized in 112 codes. Id.
76. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
77. Within a few years of the Schechter decision, cooperative industrial activities origi-
nally formulated under governmental aegis were found to be illegal with the immunities of
the National Industrial Recovery Act providing no protection.
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Even if standards were developed under the auspices of the Bureau of Standards, they also
would not be immune from penetrating judicial analysis. The defense of immunity arising
from intervention by the Bureau of Standards was asserted in Federal Trade Commission v.
Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934). In this decision the Supreme Court upheld the
Federal Trade Commission's finding that a group of lumber dealers unfairly competed in
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(I)(Supp. I, 1975)) by using the trade name "California White Pine" when
in fact the lumber was "Western Yellow Pine." The Court was not at all impressed with the
fact that "California White Pine" was earlier listed as a trade equivalent of "Western Yellow
Pine" by the National Bureau of Standards in its attempt to help establish standard commer-
cial names for lumber. The Court noted that the Bureau's recommendations for simplified
lumber nomenclature were wholly advisory, and the lumber dealers were free to ignore them.
The Court ruled that the Bureau was merely attempting to eliminate superfluous variety
through the voluntary action of industrial groups, and that its function of simplifying busi-
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swiftly changing events did nothing to alleviate the existing uncer-
tainties over collective standards processed 8 and the institution by
the Federal Trade Commission of its first standards action" only
added grieviously to these deteriorating circumstances. But as dif-
ficult as times were, they would soon be eclipsed by the titanic
struggle of World War II, which propelled this nation into its
greatest collective productive effort.
There were serious initial problems in conserving resources and
raw materials, converting from civilian to wartime production, con-
structing arms and munitions factories, and establishing priorities,
allocations, and rations.80 To accomplish these goals, the President
created a War Production Board"l which like its World War I prede-
cessor standardized products, processes, and eliminated unessen-
tials.52 This shift from a free enterprise economy troubled many
ness by substituting uniformity of methods for wasteful diversity through cooperative action
was far different from the Commission's goal of making the process of competition fair. The
Court seemed to be tacitly approving the "cooperative" approach to standards without sen-
sing the basic antitrust issue.
78. A strong feeling of apprehensiveness resulting from the law's vagueness has been
attributed by one commentator to two additional factors, the comprehensive investigation of
business practices conducted by the Temporary National Economic Committee and a new
and far stricter position by the Supreme Court toward joint or cooperative action by competi-
tors in Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939), and its holding that:
It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the
distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it. Each distributor
was advised that the others were asked to particpate; each knew that cooperation was
essential to successful operation of the plan . . .Acceptance by competitors, without
previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary conse-
quences of which, if carried out, in restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to
establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.
Fisher, Antitrust During National Emergencies: II, 40 MICH. L. Rav. 1161, 1193-94 (1942).
79. In the Matter of the Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., complaint issued November 1, 1938,
F.T.C. Dkt. No. 3643, order entered August 28, 1939. See 29 F.T.C. 749 (1939).
80. H. FAULKNER, Asm~ucA ECONoMics HITORY 699-701 (8th ed. 1960).
81. SCIENCE Poiacy RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 17 n.41, reports that the War
Production Board:
limited the sizes and weights of tubular radiators . . . [which] saved 23,000 tons of
cast iron. Builder's hardware was reduced from about 27,000 to 3,500 items. Sixty-five
percent of all types and sizes of brass and bronze pipe fittings were eliminated and
the variety of brass and bronze valves was reduced from 4,079 to 2,504 types, saving
thousands of tons of carbon steel, cooper, and alloy steel.
82. The American Standards Association had this to say about the role of standards
during the War:
Never before has the country been so standards-conscious. The President-his
Director of Economic Stabilization-the Army-the Navy-WPB-OPA-
industry-are all using standards as a means of carrying out the tasks imposed upon
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industrialists fearing antitrust reprisals.13 But, except for the lim-
ited immunities during the Depression, enforcement had not pre-
viously been suspended completely and it would not be now. 4 The
Justice Department refrained from opposing collectively mobilized
resources, but reserved the right to proceed civilly against public
interest abuses. 85 Congress, on the other hand, took a more affirma-
tive step by including an antitrust immunity for businesses com-
bined at the behest of the War Production Board with approval of
the Attorney General. 8 Mobilization then resumed without fear of
enforcement, that is until it was disrupted by a massive antitrust
effort growing out of the organized standards programs of the 1900's.
Both the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
filed multitudinous cases against standards. The Department ob-
tained comprehensive indictments, and filed complementary civil
injunctive suits, against a score of organizations for price fixing and
employing standards in order to boycott competitors from the mar-
them by the war.
Standards are being debated on the floor of Congress, which has set up a committee
to study their use. The WPB is using them to conserve materials, man-power, and
production facilities. They are basc in government procurement. They are basic in
subcontracting. OPA has found that price cannot be controlled without standards to
define the product.
SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIviSION, supra note 16, at 17.
83. Berge, Antitrust Enforcement in the War and Postwar Period, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
376 (1944).
84. See Fisher I and II, discussed in notes 46 and 74 supra.
85. Berge, supra note 83, at 377-80. See also Fisher II, supra note 92, at 1195; TIMBERLAKE,
supra note 71, at 326; and Schilz, Voluntary Industrial Agreements and Their Exemption
from the Antitrust Laws, 40 VA. L. Rsv. 1 (1954).
Another wartime control, which partially affected antitrust enforcement, was an under-
standing that the Department would postpone investigations and trials. If the Secretary of
War or Navy believed that any investigation or prosecution would seriously interfere with the
war effort, the Attorney General either would abide by the decision and defer activity, or,
would appeal the decision to the President. Before any matter could be deferred it would have
to be clear that the war effort was being impeded. In each case, action finally taken would
be public and the investigaion or prosecution would commence as soon as it appeared that it
would no longer interfere with war production. Berge, supra note 83, at 382-83.
86. Small Business Mobilization Act § 12, 56 Stat. 357, repealed, July 25, 1947, ch. 327,
§ 1, 61 Stat. 449.
Efforts to extend the immunities of the Small Business Mobilization Act beyond the appro-
priate statutory limits were met with stern resistance by the courts. The Supreme Court held
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 324 U.S. 439 (1945), that a certificate of immunity
issued by the Chairman of the War Production Board did not authorize rate-fixing by the
defendant railroads outside the approved rate bureau framework. See also United States v.
Association of American Railroads, 4 F.R.D. 510 (D. Neb. 1945); United States v. General
Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157 (D.N.J. 1949).
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ketplace.5 7 It successfully achieved open grade-making and certifi-
cation services for interested parties at reasonable fees and made
trademarks available to all qualifiers."' As a result, standards organ-
izations would now be operated more fairly, more equitably, and
with far less discrimination. Also, some organizations were forced to
divest their standards function or establish independent and auton-
omous bureaus for all grading, standardizing, and inspecting serv-
ices.8 1 This assuredly opened some standards programs, 0 but did
provoke considerable outrage against the Department.
Industry and the press firmly believed that the Department was
resolutely opposed to standards usage. Part of the confusion can be
attributed to the fact that a number of standards were implemented
after painstaking adherence to Commerce Department procedures
which normally take several years and engage the creative efforts of
industrial and governmental officials. In fact, some of the programs
were originally sponsored by the Bureau of Standards and perpetu-
ated by it over the years." Thus, in spite of these laborious efforts
by one governmental branch, another was seemingly frustrating the
entire effort. To stem the rising tide of adverse public criticism,
Thurman Arnold of the Antitrust Division in an open newspaper
letter defended the suits as "desirable for the general benefit of both
. . .industry. . . and the. . . public, the defendant .. .unrea-
87. These antitrust cases most surely rank among the most massive in Justice Depart-
ment history. The number of defendants consisted of 34 trade associations, 270 companies
and 110 individuals. The defendants comprised a large segment of the softwood lumber
industry, and included lumber manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and commission sales-
men.
88. United States v. Western Pine Ass'n., indictment returned September 18, 1940, Cr.
14522, (S.D. Cal.), civil complaint filed Feb. 6, 1941, Civ. 1389-RJ, consent decree entered
Feb. 6, 1941, 1940-1943 TRADE CAS. 56,197, at 419.
89. United States v. Southern Pine Ass'n, indictment returned February 21, 1940, Civ.
275, (E.D. La.), consent decree entered Feb. 21, 1940, 1940-1943 TRADE CAS. 56,007, at 27.
90. The Justice Department filed several other lumber cases: United States v. National
Lumber Manufacturers Association, civil complaint filed May 6, 1941, Civ. 11262, (D.D.C.),
consent decree entered May 6, 1941, 1940-1943 TRADE CAS. 56,123, at 492; United States v.
Retail Lumbermen's Ass'n., civil complaint filed Oct. 24, 1941, Civ. 378, (D. Colo.), consent
decree entered Oct. 24, 1941, 1940-1943 TRADE CAs. 56, 166, at 164; United States v. West
Coast Lumbermen's Ass'n., indictment returned September 25, 1940, Cr. 14532, (S.D. Cal.),
civil complaint filed April 16, 1941, Civ. 1488-Y, consent decree entered April 16, 1941, 1940-
1943 TRADE CAs. 56,122, at 486; and United States v. National Retail Lumber Dealers
Ass'n., indictment returned April 14, 1941, Cr. 9337, (D. Colo.), civil complaint filed January
3, 1942, Civ. 406, consent decree entered January 3, 1942, 1940-1943 TRADE CAs. 56,181, at
662.
91. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENcE BOARD, supra note 16, at 89.
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sonably . . .misused the standardization program . . . . [which]
in and out of themselves are not condemned by the department. It
is the wrongful use to which such programs have been put that has
been questioned."" He later repeated these sentiments in a letter
to the Commerce Department, which passed word along to industry
but failed to warn of the dire legal conseqences of operating a man-
datory program outside of the war effort. 3
The public obloquy failed to deter the Department94 and, along
with the Federal Trade Commission, 5 it continued to assail indus-
92. PEARCE, supra note 20, at 318-19.
93. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 56, at 317 n.45.
94. The Department's price-fixing actions were against an association of carpet manufac-
turers (for illegally limiting'merchandise lines), United States v. Institute of Carpet Mfgrs.,
civil complaint filed January 28, 1941, Civil 12-416, (S.D.N.Y.), consent decree entered Feb-
ruary 6, 1941, 1940-1943 TRADE CAS. $ 56,097, at 384; a manufacturer of synthetic nitrogen
products and other unidentified producers and distributors of nitrogen fertilizers (for illegally
determining the kind and amount of fertilizer to be sold and the amount of nitrogen to be
included in fertilizer), United States v. Snythetic Nitrogen Products Corp., civil complaint
filed September 5, 1941, Civil 15-365, (S.D.N.Y.), consent decree entered on September 5,
1941, 1940-1943 TRADE CAS. 56,170, at 628; an association of manufacturers of flexible metal
hose and tubing (for illegally inducing consumers and governmental agencies to accept recom-
mendations and specifications of the association for particular types of hose and tubing and
for forcing non-members to join the association or be excluded from the market), United
States v. American Brass Co., Criminal No. 112-154, indictment returned May 27, 1942,
(S.D.N.Y.); large electrical manufacturers of fluorescent lamps (for unlawfully reducing or
eliminating the kinds, quantities, sizes and styles of fluorescent lamps), United States v.
General Electric Co., civil complaint filed December 9, 1942, Civil 2590, (D.N.J.), consent
decree entered March 26, 1954, 1954 TRADE CAS. 67,714 at 69,294; and manufacturers of fire
extinguishers (for illegally producing only extinguishers of a particular size and color).
95. During the 1940's the Federal Trade Commission was also very active, and filed sev-
eral standards proceedings alleging unfair trade practices in violation of Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act. The Commission, like the Department, alleged in most of these
that a particular trade association unlawfully conspired to fix prices, and that it standardized
certain products in order to facilitate the conspiracy. The Commission institued proceedings
against producers of hardwood charcoal (for unlawfully establishing the sizes of packages in
which charcoal was packaged for retail sales), The Tennessee Products Corporation, com-
plaint issued July 9, 1941, F.T.C. Docket No. 4535, order entered March 23, 1948, 44 F.T.C.
1193; an association of manufacturers of electrical alloy resistance wire (for illegally adopting
and maintaining uniform resistance standards and other uniform standards for manufactur-
ing wire), Electrical Alloy Section of National Electrical Manufactureres Association, com-
plaint issued August 7, 1941, F.T.C. Docket No. 4558, order entered March 16, 1943, 36 F.T.C.
335; and manufacturers of traffic signal and traffic signal equipment (for illegally standardiz-
ing signals), Crouse-Hinds Co., complaint issued October 9, 1941, F.T.C. Docket No. 4610,
order entered January 23, 1950, 46 F.T.C. 1114. In Crouse-Hinds the Federal Trade Commis-
sion found for the defendants, and noted in its opinion the absence of any conspiratorial
conduct. The Commission further observed that "[wihile the products of the industry are
highly standardized, the greater weight of the evidence shows that this is due to the efforts
of the Institute of Traffic Engineers, a professional society whose chief officers and most of
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try. The Commission even filed the most ambitious action to date
which, unlike the others, presented several novel issues. It did not
merely attack another classic hard-core pricing conspiracy, but in
Tag Manufacturers Institute," challenged the reporting by competi-
tors of their prices which deviated from their respective published
list prices. The court of appeals found the practice lawful and, once
dismissing the price stabilization charge, easily disposed of the stan-
dards allegation by stressing their salutory economic benefits. 7
With this one stunning defeat, history's most concentrated enforce-
ment effort came to an abrupt conclusion. Surprisingly, not one of
the standards charges was reviewed by the Supreme Court; how-
ever, in other decisions, it did somewhat ratify and amplify the
existing antitrust doctrine mandating open and non-discriminatory
standards programs . 8 And, during the War years, serious debate as
its members are employed in the electric light divisions of municipalities." Id. at 1120.
Commissioner Mead, who wrote the opinion, later stated publicly that he holds firmly "to
the belief that no suggestion of wrongdoing arises from joint action taken in an effort to solve
mutual problems or to improve the well-being of any group so long as those who participate
do not act in such a manner as to injure those who do not participate, including competitors,
suppliers, and customers." 2 AMERICAN TRADE ASSOCIATION EXECUTVE JouRNAL 49, 53 (1950).
The FTC brought further actions against an association of manufacturers of steel and other
metallic chain and chain parts (for unlawfully establishing simplifying standards for chains),
Chain Institute, Inc., complaint issued December 12, 1942, F.T.C. Docket No. 4878, order
entered February 16, 1953, 49 FTC 1041; an association of manufacturers of cylindrical liquid
tight paper containers (for unlawfully fixing standard uniform sizes and colors for such con-
tainers), Liquid Tight Paper Container Ass'n., complaint issued January 22, 1942, F.T.C.
Docket No. 4675, order entered May 29, 1945, 40 F.T.C. 630; an association of milk and ice
cream can manufacturers (for unlawfully standardizing milk and ice cream cans), The Milk
and Ice Cream Can Institute, complaint issued July 31, 1941, F.t.C. Docket No. 4551, order
entered Sept. 18, 1943, 37 FTC 419, affl'd, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946); an association of
manufacturers of coupon books (for unlawfully standardizing the size, style and color of
coupon books and the weight and quality of paper and cardboard used in coupon books),
Association of Coupon Book Manufacturers, complaint issued April 1, 1948, F.T.C. Docket
No. 5532, order entered Sept. 3, 1948, 45 F.T.C. 219; an association of manufacturers of
malleable iron chain (for unlawfully setting specifications for iron chain). Malleable Chain
Manufacturers Institute, complaint issued May 18, 1949, F.T.C. Docket No. 5657, order
entered May 23, 1952, 48 F.T.C. 1163; and an association of manufacturers of crown bottle
caps (for unlawfully standardizing the coloring, lettering and decorations of crown bottle
caps), Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. FTC, complaint issued September 30, 1941, F.T.C. Docket
No. 4602, order entered August 4, 1948, 45 FTC 89, modified and aff'd, 176 F.2d 974 (4th Cir.
1949).
96. Tag Manufacturers Institute v. FTC, complaint issued May 2, 1941, F.T.C. Docket
No. 4496, order entered May 19, 1947, 43 F.T.C. 499, set aside 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949).
97. 174 F.2d at 461.
98. In Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), the Court held that a trade
association could not refuse on a collective basis to sell to manufacturers and retailers who
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to the advisability of privately or governmentally determined stan-
dards raged on. In 1943 the Secretary of Commerce reviewed a re-
port advocating the governmental formulation of consumer goods
standards, but not the collateral establishment of industrial stan-
dards." The report's findings were underscored in another Com-
merce study in 1945 which likewise called for private industrial
standards only, with subsidiary governmental testing and research
by the Bureau of Standards. 100
What was discernible about collective standardization and the
antitrust laws at the close of this tumultuous period? One observer
commented on the obvious conflict between the "benign" attitude
of the Commerce Department and the Justice Department's aggres-
sive enforcement. 1 1 The government was, it seemed to him, encour-
aging private development, 02 on the one hand, but frustrating the
entire effort, on the other.'0 This so-called "schizophrenia"''04 was
completely predictable from a public choice point of view. From this
perspective, Commerce and Justice will remain in this historic con-
flict until Congress recognizes the true public nature of standards
and understands the basic incompatibility of collective standardiza-
tion and the individualistic dictates of the Sherman Act. It will be
dealt in copies of its members' stolen designs on the grounds that this amounted to a per se
illegal boycott under Section 1. Henceforth, any industry trade organization, including by
implication any standard-making group, may not under any circumstances foreclose impor-
tant avenues of commerce to competitors through boycotts or other such concerted means.
The Court supported this holding in American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S.
519 (1943), in which it was faced with another boycott question. The Court concluded that
any trade association, even an august medical association, exercises economic power, and
must be extremely careful not to use such economic power collectively in order to drive non-
group members out of business or coerce them into abandoning economic decisions which no
law forbids them from making. In the last important decision of the 1940's, Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the Court ruled that two by-laws, one which prohibited
the dissemination to non-members of news developed by either the Associated Press or its
members, and another which empowered members to block membership applications of non-
members, unlawfully foreclosed non-members from the Associated Press. Under these deci-
sions, a standards program must be operated fairly and impartially and must be available to
members and non-members alike.
99. SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 17-18.
100. Id. at 18-19.
101. Mason, Bureaucracy Psychoanalyzed: The Case of Antitrust vs. National Standards,
33 HARV. Bus. REV. 84 (1955).
102. Id. at 85.
103. For a full statement of Thurman Arnold's antitrust enforcement views during the
War period, reference should be made to Arnold & Livingston, Antitrust War Policy and Full
Production, 20 HARv. Bus. REV. 265 (1942).
104. Mason, supra note 101, at 85.
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interesting to compare this prediction with the observer's prophecy
that the forthcoming Eisenhower Administration will reverse the
"schizophrenia" of the 40's and the return to the governmental co-
operativeness of the Hoover era. 05
0. Third Historical Stage From the 1950's to the Present
The observer was remarkably prophetic. During all of the 50's, the
Justice Department instituted only four actions (but only one after
the Eisenhower Administration was firmly in command) and the
Federal Trade Commission not a single one. Of course, this atten-
uated enforcement effort could be attributed to a renewed coopera-
tive attitude, but more likely was due to the Korean War.106 Busi-
ness was voluntarily mobilized by the President under Congres-
sional authorization, 0 7 and granted a limited antitrust exemption. 101
Whatever the reason for decreased enforcement, the observer failed
to foresee that the antitrust laws would nonetheless be pursued by
private citizens beginning in the late 1950's and increasing in recent
years. Without question, the decade of the 40's will remain unparal-
leled for the intensity of the governmental enforcement effort, but
the private actions of the coming decades will prove to be just as
significant for reasons which will become clear.
Although the four Departmental actions of the 1950's' 9 were con-
105. Id. at 89-90.
106. House SUBCOMMITEE ON STUDY OF MONOPOLY PowER, THE MOBILIZATION PROGRAM,
H.R. REP. No. 1217, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 95, at 8-12 (1951).
107. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 2061-2166 (App. 1951), as amended 50
U.S.C. § 2061 (App. 1975).
108. Id. § 2158. For discussions of the Korean War antitrust immunity, see Correa, The
Organization for Defense Mobilization, 13 THE FED. B.J. 1 (1952); Edwards, Government
Policy on Business Practices, 42 AM. ECON. REv. 404 (1952); Ray, Trade Associations and
Government-Industry Advisory Committees, 6 A.B.A. ANTrrRusT SEC. 313 (1961), and Lunn,
Voluntary Cooperative Actiorl Between Industry and Government Under the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950, 13 TE FED. B.J. 35 (1952).
109. In 1954 the Department proceeded against machine tool manufacturers. United
States v. Cincinnati Milling Machine Co., No. 13401, (E.D. Mich. April 19, 1954). The action
terminated with a consent judgment (consent decree entered April 19, 1954, 1954 TRADE CAs.
67,733 at 69,361) prohibiting the manufacturers from agreeing not to manufacture or sell
any particular type of milling machine. In the same year, the Department obtained a consent
judgment enjoining the Association of Vertical Turbine Pump Manufacturers and their mem-
bers from fixing prices and establishing uniform products and specifications. United States
v. National Ass'n. of Vertical Turbine Pump Mfgrs, civil complaint No. 29446 (N.D. Cal.
January 26, 1950), consent decree entered June 30, 1954, 1954 TRADE CAS. 67,803 at 69,587.




ceptually identical to those of the 40's, private parties attacked
boldly along a much broader front. Standards, themselves, were
challenged directly for their implicit discriminatory and exclusion-
ary effects and not merely as devices for facilitating pricing coordi-
nation."0 In the most important of the private suits, Structural
Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Association, " plaintiff ply-
wood producer charged an association with unreasonably maintain-
ing a standard which he admittedly could not meet. On review, the
court ruled in favor of the association on the grounds that the stan-
dard was neither formulated with evil intent nor unreasonably nar-
row, and that his plywood had a poor technical reputation. Al-
though sufficient discriminatory and exclusionary evidence was
heard in these private suits, a violation was not formed until two
other plaintiffs advanced traditional per se conspiratorial theories.
In one, a manufacturer alleged a conspiracy between the American
Medical Association and the General Electric Company to promote
GE's lamps under an AMA seal exclusively. The Court, in denying
a preliminary motion to dismiss, held that the alleged conspirators
engaged in conduct approximating a boycott which would be illegal
under the Sherman Act.' In the second, the Supreme Court was
presented with its first opportunity to review a standards program
in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co."' The
Court ruled that the Sherman Act forbids an association of gas
burner manufacturers and public utilities from denying the plaintiff
try certain uniform practices advocated by the American Water Works Association. 'The
Department the following year obtained a consent judgment which prohibited the Roll Manu-
facturers Institute and its members from price fixing and agreeing to limit the manufacture
of cast iron and cast iron steel rolls in accordance with agreed upon standards, grades, or
qualities. United States v. Roll Manufacturers Institute, No. 96-57 "(W.D. Pa. June 20,
1951)(complaint filed), consent decree entered August 4, 1955, 1955 TRADE CAS. 68,110 at
70,604. The most significant was against railroad car coupler manufacturers which the De-
partment lost with the district court ruling that standardized couplers were in the public
interest.
United States v. National Malleable & Steel Castings Co., 1957 TRADE CAS. 58,890, 73,580
(N.D. Ohio 1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 38 (1958) (per curiam).
110. Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957); Roofire
Alarm Co. v. Underwriter's Laboratories, 118 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d
360 (6th Cir. 1960); and Appalachian Power Co. v. American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 268 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 1024 (1969).
111. Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore.
1966), aff'd, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 1024 (1969).
112. Boerstler v. American Medical Ass'n, 16 F.R.D. 437 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
113. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
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manufacturer a seal of approval which is necessary before the utili-
ties would provide gas."' The Court easily found an antitrust viola-
tion based on well established anti-boycott principles."'
Although challenging directly the legality of standards, the gov-
ernment did not in response file any cases to settle this important
policy issue. In fact, the Department of Justice did not bring a single
action with standards implications from 1954 to 1962, and only
brought two piece fixing cases with standards allegations in the
1960's"l and one in the 70's."7 The Federal Trade Commission was
114. This decision has been interpreted as protecting the right of consumers to obtain the
degree of product quality as they might choose rather than having their judgment usurped
through the unilateral agreement of producers outside the market. This interpretation was
made by a Congressional subcommittee which was of the opinion that:
The case of Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gaslight and Coke Company . . . held
that a standard may not properly be used to exclude a serviceable but nondeluxe
product from the marketplace by requiring that all the manufacturers of a given
product conform to needlessly high standards. The right of the consumer to obtain less
by paying less is basic.
HousE SELEcT Commrrraa ON SMALL Busiass, THE E mCr UPON SMALL BusnmmSS OF VOLUN-
TARY INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS, H.R. REP. No. 1981, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1968) at 77.
115. A plaintiff manufacturer in another antitrust action charged a similar offense in two
actions, Watts Regulator Company v. American Gas Ass'n., Civil No. 66-228 (W.D. Mass.)
and Watts Regulator Company v. Western Plumbing Officials Association, Civil No. 66-1124
(S.D. Cal.) In both actions the manufacturer alleged that competing manufacturers, an
association, and utilities conspired to develop and maintain a standard which could not be
met by the plaintiff manufacturer. Both suits were ultimately settled when the associations
agreed to acknowledge the plaintiff's product. See G. LAMP & C. SHIELDs, TRADE ASSOCIATION
LAW AND PR.cricE, 32 n.122 (1971).
116. Again, as were the Sherman Act cases of the early 1950's, the two Department
standards challenges during the 1960's were actually price fixing actions accompanied by
standards allegations. In 1962, the Department charged two asbestos-cement pipe manufac-
turers with fixing prices and attempting to eliminate the importation and sale of foreign-made
asbestos pipe into the United States. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., Cr. No. 21-118
(E.D. Pa. June 1, 1962) civil complaint No. 31791 filed July 25, 1962, (E.D.Pa.). However,
the case prior to trial was reduced to the standards allegations, see 259 F.Supp. 440 (E.D.
Pa. 1966), with the Department seeking to enjoin one of the defendants from a standards-
making organization which adopted specifications allegedly designed to restrict the use of
foreign-made asbestos-cement pipe. In granting summary judgment for the defendant, 1967
TRADE CAS. 72,184 at 84,249, the district court considered scientific justifications for the
specifications and found ample evidence to support their reasonableness. The court was
persuaded that this type of pipe, which was transported on ships, was more likely to be
damaged than pipe transported by other means, that any damaged pipe would often be
undetected by visual inspection, and that the ultimate consumer cost of reexcavating and
reinstalling new pipe was prohibitive. Of particular importance to the court was the evidence
that many municipalities and consulting engineers, and at least one federal agency, had
already on their own adopted requirements that all pipe must be tested in the United States.
Again, as with the private actions of the 1950's, standards withstood scrutiny under a rule of
reason analysis impervious to implicit exclusionary and discriminatory implications.
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even less active. It only initiated one in recent years, but ironically
it coincidentally brought into question again the issue of standards
legality. In this 1962 complaint,"8 the Commission asserted that the
setting of a product's composition by a trade association constituted
illegal price-fixing. Faced with a shortage of wheat, members of the
association approved a resolution that their product should consist
of a scarce wheat equally blended with a more common wheat. The
Commission held the resolution to be an attempt to lower the total
industry demand for the scarce wheat, and thus to ward off price
competition for the available supply. Arguably, the resolution is not
a product standard in the usual sense, except both the Commission
and the Seventh Circuit at this late date disclaimed that "all efforts
at product standardization" are illegal under the antitrust
laws"'-thereby raising once more the perennial question of which
are lawful.
After some seventy years of Sherman Act enforcement, the fact
that the law was unsettled and remained unclear was further re-
flected by the number of public appearances by enforcement offi-
cials to explain the antitrust law of standards. In almost all of these
public speeches, 20 they extolled the economic virtues of standards,
The only other standards action of the 1960's brought by the Department was against
several plumbing fixtures manufacturers for fixing prices and agreeing to discontinue the
manufacture of a less expensive grade of fixtures in favor of a more expensive grade. United
States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., Cr. No. 296 (E.D. Pa. October 6,
1966)(indictment returned), civil complaint No. 1921 filed October 6, 1966. The manufac-
turers entered into a consent decree, which prohibited them from limiting, restricting, or dis-
continuing the manufacture of any plumbing fixtures. 1971 TRADE CAS. 1 73,579 at 90,409.
117. The most recent Department action was in 1970. The American Society of Mechani-
cal Engineers, United States v. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. and The
National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, complaint filed July 22, 1970, Civil
No. 3141, S.D.N.Y., was charged with refusing to inspect and certify foreign-manufactud
boilers. The Society discontinued this practice, and agreed in a consent judgment, 1972 TRADE
CAs. 74,028 at 92,256, to inspect all boilers regardless of origin.
118. National Macaroni Mfgrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 65 F.T.C. 538 (1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 421
(7th Cir. 1965).
119. 65 F.T.C. at 612 and 345 F.2d at 427.
120. Speeches by Officials from the Justice Department include Statistical Standardiza-
tion and Research Activities, delivered by Ephraim Jacobs, Chief, Legislative Section, Anti-
trust Division, before Antitrust Section, American Bar Association, on April 1, 1955;
Antitrust Problems of Industry Codes of Advertising, Standardization, and Seals of Approval,
delivered by Robert B. Hummel, Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division, before
the 1968 Antitrust Symposium of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, reprinted
in 13 ANTIrrrusT BuLL. 607 (1968); Antitrust Questions in Voluntary Industry Standards,
delivered by Lionel Kestenbaum, Antitrust Division, before The National Association of
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while exhorting strict compliances with the antitrust laws.' 2' How-
ever, one official took a vastly different position. Donald F. Turner,
head of the Antitrust Division from 1967 to 1969, presented several
Manufacturers Marketing Conference, on October 9, 1969; Antitrust Implications of Private
Standard-Making Activity, delivered by Barry Grossman, Assistant Chief, Evaluation Sec-
tion, Antitrust Division, before the 51st Annual Meeting of the American National Standards
Institute, on November 20, 1969; Antitrust and the Non-Profit Organization - A Current Look
at an Old Problem, delivered by Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust
Division, before the Ninth Annual Conference on Federal Tax and Other Problems of Non-
Profit Organizations, on February 9, 1973; and most recently Standards for Standards-
Makers, delivered by John H. Shinefield, Ass't Atty. Gen., Antitrust Division, before the
American Natl. Standards Institute, on March 29, 1978.
Speeches by Officials of the Federal Trade Commission include Federal Trade Commission
and Antitrust Enforcement delivered by Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Chairman, before the Anti-
trust Law Section of the New York Bar Association, on January 28, 1971; Expanded Roles
for Trade Associations, delivered by James T. Halverson, Director of Competition, before the
Symposium on Trade Associations of the Antitrust Law Committee of the Bar Association of
the District of Columbia in March, 1973, reprinted in 18 ANTrrRUST BuLL. 221 (1973);
Testimony of Federal Trade Commission by Calvin J. Collier, Chairman, before the Subcom-
mittee on Energy and Power, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House
of Representatives, on March 3, 1977; and Statement of Calvin J. Collier, Chairman, before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
on June 21, 1976.
121. In addition to public pronouncements, the two enforcement agencies issued several
advisory opinions over the last few years. The Federal Trade Commission during the 1960's
issued three advisory opinions relating to standards. In one of these opinions it advised a trade
association that it had no objections to the publishing of a product standard as an "industry
goal" as long as seals of approval would not be given only to industry members meeting the
standard. Advisory Opinion Digest No. 4 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. $
17,345 at 22,510 (FTC 1965). In another opinion it refused to approve a trade association's
product standards program that made association membership conditioned upon using the
association's quality certification mark. Advisory Opinion Digest No. 96 [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,723, at 23,007 (FTC 1966). However, it did say that non-
members could be charged a higher fee for the use of the mark, provided the differential
merely insured that non-members "pay an equal share of the cost necessary to support the
program." Id. And most recently it approved a plan by the construction industry to imple-
ment an accreditation program. Advisory Opinion Digest No. 350 [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 18,826 at 21,165 (FTC 1969). The enforcement officials also
offered advice in letters to government agencies. A letter of June 17, 1969 was sent from
Richard L. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to the National Com-
mission on Product Safety and a letter of March 28, 1973 from his succesor, Thomas E.
Kauper, to the Bureau of Product Safety (TRADE REG. REP. 1 50,182, at 55,334). Generally,
both letters contain the usual advice regarding a lawfully formulated and implemented stan-
dards program.
Of more significance was a Federal Trade Commission Staff study of April 22, 1972 entitled
Self-Regulation-Product Standardization, Certificate and Seals of Approval, which recom-
mends that the Federal Trade Commission, itself, conduct a study in order to help develop a
national policy on standardization and certification and emphasizes that standardization and
certification have a large potential for public benefit and for public injury.
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thoughtful analyses of the sometimes incompatible world of stan-
dards and the antitrust laws.' In his view, standards almost
amount to a specific exemption to the antitrust laws, and therefore
would be better handled governmentally rather than through pri-
vate voluntary action. He has remained the lone antitrust propo-
nent of this position, with all other enforcers generally advocating
standards while emphasizing the legal risks.
Precisely what is Turner's position? In 1966 he asked rhetorically
whether there could be any possible justifications for voluntary
standards. He answered that any plausible justification must be
quite limited and pass careful examination.I He thought, for exam-
ple, that a product standard, designed to preserve the health and
safety consumers, would not be attacked as long as there were no
less restrictive methods of making the product safer. He doubted
that private standards would be a suitable substitute for legislation
in those instances in which health and safety were not clear cut.24
Thus, he comes close to arguing that standards, since they reduce
product alternatives and can make prices rigid and uniform, should
only be adopted through specific governmental intervention and not
by the. private interests.2 5
122. Cooperation Among Competitors, delivered by Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, before the Fifth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, on October
13, 1966; Antitrust Aspects of Industry Cooperation and Product Standardization, delivered
by Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the Briefing
Conference on Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966, on May 26, 1967; Consumer Protec-
tion by Private Joint Action, delivered by Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, before the Annual Meeting of the Antitrust Law Section of the New York
State Bar, on January 26, 1967, reprinted in CCH 1967 ATTrrRusT LAw SymPosiuM N.Y. STATE
BAR ASSN. at 36-46.
For a criticism of Turner's position regarding the governmental formulation of standards,
see Wachtel, Product Standards and Certification Programs, 13 Antitrust Bull. 1 (1968).
123. Cooperation Among Competitors, supra note 122, at 10-11.
124. Id. at 11-12.
125. Turner was similarly cautious a few years earlier with Carl Kaysen of their treatise,
ANTITRUST POLICv (1959). Their circumspect attitude towards standards was that
[Aigreements to standardize products . . . [are] troublesome . . . inasmuch as
standardization in most cases is likely to have desirable consequences and at the same
time reduce the uncertainties that play a competitive role in a small-numbers market.
We are inclined to conclude that standardization of sizes, grades, qualities, and the
like should be treated as presumptively lawful in itself; that further evidence of intent
to eliminate competition, as appeared in connection with the agreement to eliminate
sales of "Seconds" in Standard Sanitary, must be shown in order to identify the
standardization as being a part of a price-fixing scheme.
Id. at 151.
Industrial Standards
Turner was not alone in his cautious approach toward private
standardization. Both the Commerce Department, which commis-
sioned its third and fourth studies since the 40's, and the Congress,
which at last instituted its own hearings, seriously considered pri-
vate and public standardization and the precise role of the Bureau
of Standards. Commerce in 1958 appointed a committee' 2 which
noted the confusion over standards and cited the absence of a na-
tional program as the cause. The committee recommended a
strengthened research and scientific capability for the Bureau, but
no positive remedial policy except the formation of another commit-
tee possibly leading to a unified and coordinated national ap-
proach.'2 1 Such a committee was formed in 1963.128 For the first
time, it was proposed that standards should be developed through
a national coordinating institute of industry, end users, and con-
sumer interests governed by Justice Department antitrust guide-
lines.' Unfortunately, the committee's findings were ignored by
Commerce, but the proposed institute captured the imagination of
several concerned congressmen and served as a workable paradigm
for their proposed remedial legislation.
Although standards' broad external impact was apparent since
last century's era of industrial consolidation, it was not until Con-
gressional hearings by the House in 1968'0 and by the Senate in
1976-77 that these "externalities" were correctly analyzed, their
public impact accurately perceived, and corrective legislation pro-
posed. The 1968 hearings into standards' impact on the nation's
small businesses concluded with the important finding that
"[pirivate bodies. . . promulgating standards. . . are performing
what is essentially a governmental function."'' 3' From a public
choice perspective this is the only logical conclusion. Since it was
based on the accumulated evidence of actual wrongs and injustices
126. SCIENCE Poucy RESEARCH DIvIsION, supra note 16, at 20-21.
127. Id. at 21.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 23-24.
130. H.R. Rep. No. 1981, note 114 supra.
131. Id. at 75. Also expressing his view that standards making is a public rather than
private function was Ralph Nader. During an appearance before the Senate Committee on
Commerce in 1971, Nader made the point that the public standards setting process should
be public governmental function, rather than a private function, and added that
"Government should refrain from giving any support to so-called 'voluntary' standards set-
ting processes ...." SCIENCE Poucy RE SEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 81.
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perpetrated by discriminatory standards, it is a doubly convincing
indictment of the private collective process. Also, in the report of
the 1968 hearings it was recommended that Congress give serious
consideration to legislation which would require that standards be
submitted to the Commerce Deprtment for a public interest evalua-
tion and a technical appraisal, and to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion for an antitrust evaluation.' Congress disregarded the recom-
mendation, but the chairman of the 1968 hearings introduced in
1969 the Federal Approval of Voluntary Industrial Standards Act1 3
which provided that standards could not be established unless ini-
tial approval was received from the Commerce Department, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the Bureau of Standards.' 3 No
committee action was ever taken on this bill.
Although these congressional proposals did not expressly call for
a national institute, it was clear that legislative sentiment was turn-
ing away from exclusive private development in the market and
toward a type of extra-market mechanism preserving some private
initiative under federal control.'5 The boldest proposalin this direc-
tion is contained in the Voluntary Standards and Accreditation Act
of 1977.136 This bill provides for a national institute for the accredita-
tion of private standards organizations. The bill does not provide for
the actual development of standards nor antitrust immunities
against prosecution. The objective of the bill is the federal coordina-
tion, management, and promulgation of standards developed
through existing private standards organizations in order to achieve
a single set of national standards recognized by both government
and industry.
IV. CHOOSING THE IDEAL STANDARDS ORGANIZATION
With this most perceptive proposal, this comparative history
reaches its conclusion without a congressional solution to the pres-
ent standards problem. Currently, there are approximately 400 dif-
ferent private standards organizations. 37 This large number of di-
132. H.R. REP. No. 1981, supra note 114, at 79.
133. H.R. 10123. See also SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 75.
134. SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 75.
135. HEARINGS ON VOLUNTARY INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS, note 5 supra.
136. S. 285, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), note 4 supra.
137. HEARINGS ON VOLUNTARY INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 1-2.
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verse and uncoordinated organizations, 38 as well as the historical
confusion, legal conflict, and organizational failure, are all consis-
tent with the previously noted unfavorable public choice judg-
ment 3 ' accorded a private organizational structure. Moreover, this
history further substantiates the theoretical public choice judg-
ment 4 ' that a public structure can only out-perform a private one
if industrial standards are mandatory in nature-a clearly intolera-
ble alternative for a free market economy. However, based on the
already assembled historical data, an ideal organizational entity
can be fashioned out of the most palatable features of both private
and public arrangements.
Examining this "ideal organizational entity" closer, it would have
to perform three basic functions: an allocative function, (dei'elop-
ment of technically proficient and non-discriminatory standards);
a financial function, (cover its costs); and a distributive function,
(promulgation of standards). "' Public choice theory teaches that a
private organization of separate firms will not promulgate standards
in a manner which will promote broad economic welfare. Character-
istically, private firms will engage in strategic conduct calculated to
grant or deny standards to a rival based on their assessment of
,jmmediate competitive impact. In contrast, a public organization,
not beset by competitive complications, can be structured so as to
promulgate standards universally. Historical experience confirms
these negative theoretical features of private standards, and history
has witnessed a greater sensitivity to more universal standards dis-
tribution by the public sector.
Turning to the financial function, it would obviously be fulfilled
by a private organization if standards were offered for a price. Inter-
estingly, economic theory holds that the allocative function would
be simultaneously fulfilled by the normal operation of a pricing
138. Regarding the absence of a coordinated national standardization policy, a president
of a private standards organization said:
There is a real danger that American industry will find itself producing and purchasing
to a host of mandatory standards that vary widely both in technical soundness and in
their acceptability to the broad spectrum of producers, users, and public interests
involved. As never before we need a strongconsistent national standards policy that
will, so to speak, set standards for standards.
SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DmsION, supra note 16, at 87.
139. See text accompanying notes 7-15 supra.
140. Id.
141. PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 7, at 178.
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mechanism. 2 Extracting a price may theoretically satisfy both
functions, but in the revealing light of historical events private or-
ganizations have consistently failed to develop essential and non-
discriminatory standards. Recall the manifold attempts of private
interests to stymie the introduction and development of advanced
machines, innovative production techniques, and new products by
formulating discriminatory standards designed to protect their in-
vestments in outmoded products and processes. Included are the
many products which were eliminated through non-essential stan-
dards merely to enhance the remaining standardized product's
price. In comparison, the government's massive standards program
administered by the War Industries Board, the efforts during World
War I, and the Great Depression effectively reduced truly non-
essential production costs and preserved vital national resources. In
the final analysis, only a public entity would develop vital standards
promulgated universally, although needing to depend partially on
moderate financial assessment of the private concerns.
In structuring such an ideal organization Congress could establish
an independent agency, which would formulate standards essen-
tially free of private interference. This is not to say that private
interests should be totally excluded. Since private organizations
have been able to formulate some technically sound and sophisti-
cated standards, they should be encouraged to petition for a partic-
ular standard when necessary. The formulation of a standard has
such great external public ramifications, only the government, act-
ing independently of outside parties, should decide what constitutes
a proper and equitable standard. Certainly, one of the significant
lessons of history is that private interests become vested and that
vesting causes conflict which could hamper later product improve-
ment. As for the other functions, Congress could provide for com-
pletely open distribution through public notice in the Federal Regis-
ter and could partially finance the organization by assessing peti-
tioners.
It is imperative that this proposed entity preserve as many free-
doms of the current private system as possible. As noted, individual
private interests will be encouraged to petition for the adoption of
a particular standard, but should they also be encouraged to peti-
tion collectively or engage in any other collective standards
142. Id. at 182-83.
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activities? Under current law, legitimate joint petitioning without
more is lawful. 4 ' The more difficult issue is whether collective agree-
ments involving a standard should be permitted. Unfortunately,
this issue is all the more difficult to resolve in light of the historical
inconsistency surrounding the antitrust law of standards. Conflict-
ing views have emerged. One, advocated by enforcement officials,
is that collectively devised private standards are lawful as a concept
under the Maple Flooring and Tag Manufacturers decisions. Any
standards practice is lawful if not used collectively to fix prices,
eliminate products, or boycott Competitors, and is otherwise permis-
sible under the rule of reason test of Standard Oil and Chicago
Board of Trade. This view hardly resolves the issue since a violation
was found in the only Supreme Court standards decision, Radiant
Burners, and virtually every private standards practice results in
impaired prices, eliminated products, and disadvantaged competi-
tors. A more realistic view is that of Professor Turner who recognizes
the pernicious effects of collective private standards, and proposes
legislatively developed standards rather than private joint stan-
dards regulated under the antitrust law.
In light of these conflicts, Congress would do well to authorize
joint petitioning through the creation of a clear and unequivocal
antitrust immunity; and by expressly prohibiting all other joint
private conduct, indeed, abolishing all private standards develop-
ment and promulgation. To do anything less would be to invite the
same kind of private action which the proposed legislation is de-
signed to eliminate. Under no circumstances should Congress
merely reiterate its general committment to a competitive economic
system and vigorous antitrust enforcement. It must specifically
remove standards development and promulgation from the market
and take it out from under the antitrust laws.
A national standards policy is within the grasp of Congress. The
Voluntary Standards and Accreditation Act of 19771"' attempts to
remedy the past inequities and failures of the current standards
system." 5 The bill does not contemplate radical abolition of the
system or the National Bureau of Standards, and its failure in this
143. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
144. See note 6 supra. See U.S. DEPARTMENT ov CoErCE, VOLUNTARY STANDARDS AND
TESTING LABORATORY ACCREDITATION (1977) for a review of Senate Bill 825.
145. The so-called "horror stories" of private standardization are catalogued in note 5
supra. See also note 158 supra.
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regard makes it less than a satisfactory proposal. Hopefully, Con-
gress in time will come to realize that the only complete solution
rests in an independent national agency, responsible for all stan-
dards development, and essentially free of conflicting private inter-
ests and antitrust concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
This historical and theoretical study of the nation's economic and
legal policies toward industrial standards has isolated a fundamen-
tal misconception about their intrinsic nature and questions the
advisability of continuing with their development in the private
sector. The theories of public choice analysis suggest that standards
are basically "public" in nature (not a "private" matter as com-
monly believed), and their collective market development by pri-
vate interests will fail. History confirms this theoretical judgment,
and suggests an ideal standards organization involving only mini-
mal private participation. The antitrust laws are perceived to be in
basic philosophic conflict with standards, and are therefore ex-
cluded from the proposed organizational scheme.
This has been an impressionistic study designed to apply a system
of logic to history and then examine the results. A much more de-
tailed study of the relevant costs and benefits associated with pri-
vate and public approaches would have to be undertaken before a
definitive judgment could be made. Nonetheless, this study should
illustrate that application of logical analysis helps to focus the in-
quiry and formulate the issues. The analysis suggests some profound
ways of locating answers to economic problems which suggest
greater governmental participation as a plausible solution.
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